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Recent Decisions
ways for a court to achieve the same protection without doing violence
to the separation of powers doctrine. In Judges for the Third Judicial
Circuit v. County of Wayne 27 the Michigan Supreme Court expressed
the two ways: (1) a court can prepare and submit a budget and argue
before the executive and legislative branches that the funds are essential
for its proper functioning; and (2) if the court has failed after using the
first method it may contractually bind the legislature by incurring a
debt for a practical necessity.28
The approach in Carroll, while stressing the separation of powers doc-
trine by giving the judiciary the absolute power to establish and order
the payment of a budget, has destroyed the doctrine of checks and
balances. Now, seven judges have control over their finances which is
an exclusive legislative function. The judiciary from this decision has
the absolute freedom which potentially enables them to destroy the
republican form of government. There is no one to determine whether
the supreme court has acted arbitrarily in its appropriation. Thus,
Carroll establishes a dangerous precedent, for even though the money
forced to be appropriated may work to the advantage of the people at
this time, it leaves the door open for the judiciary to achieve a superior
position in our government. 29
Joy Flowers Conti
CRIMINAL LAW-SUBJECT-MATrER JURISDICTION-RETROACTIVITY-The
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York has held
that O'Callahan v. Parker, a decision concerning subject-matter juris-
diction, must be applied retroactively.
Flemings v. Chafee, 330 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
In 1944 Flemings was a Navy serviceman stationed in New Jersey. He
was lawfully absent from the installation, when he stole a car in Tren-
ton, and drove it to central Pennsylvania where he was apprehended by
Pennsylvania State Police. Flemings was turned over to military author-
27. 172 N.W.2d 436 (Mich. 1969).
28. Id. at 440.
29. President Washington warned of this development in talking of the doctrine of
checks and balances when he said, "[L]et there be no change by usurpation; for, though
this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which
free governments are destroyed." 12 G. WASHINGTON, WRITINGS SELECTED FROM THE ORIGINAL
MANUSCRIPTS WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR BY JERUND SPARKS, 382-398 (1848).
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ities at the Brooklyn Navy Yard where he was convicted of auto theft
and sentenced by a court-martial to three years confinement and a
dishonorable discharge.
In 1970 Flemings brought the present action to compel the correction
of his military records, alleging that under O'Callahan v. Parker' his
crime was not "service connected." Flemings claimed a court without
subject-matter jurisdiction over the offense alleged could not affect the
status of a person before it. Any judgment the court made concerning
that subject was void. Flemings further contended that since his crime
was not "service connected" the court martial of 1944 had no jurisdic-
tion over the subject-matter of his offense; therefore, its judgment was
invalid and his dishonorable discharge must be corrected.2 The district
court accepted Flemings' contentions, and rejected the government's
claim that even if Flemings' offense was not "service connected,"
O'Callahan should not be applied retroactively.3
'T .L.iepo.lem of appliction Of ne r sl of l w has hen traditinnAllv
governed by the Blackstonian theory that all new rules of law are ap-
plied retroactively.4 The United States Supreme Court has developed an
exception to the normal rule of retroactivity. Prospective application
of a new decision has been implemented in the areas of constitutional
and criminal law. This exceptional application, however, has been used
only when particular factors have been present. In Linkletter v. Walker,5
the Court held there was no constitutional guarantee to either retro-
active or prospective application of new constitutional criminal deci-
sions.6 Following Linkletter, the Court decided in Stovall v. Denno,7
that there was a three-pronged test to determine the application given to
a new constitutional decision. This test was based on consideration of
1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, 2) the reliance by the law
enforcement agencies on the old rule, and 3) the burden on the ad-
1. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). O'Callahan held that "cases arising in the land and naval forces"
were exempted from the fifth amendment necessity of prosecution by indictment, and
inferentially from the sixth amendment right to a jury trial. If a case did not come within
the exemption the defendant was entitled to all his constitutional rights. The O'Callahan
test to determine when cases arise in the land or naval forces was a multiple-factor ap-
proach including considerations of status of defendant, type of offense, place of offense,
and time of offense. The practical effect of O'Callahan was to deny military courts-martial
the power to try cases that did not meet the O'Callahan test of "service connection."
2. Flemings v. Chaffee, 330 F. Supp. 193, 195 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
3. Id. at 193.
4. Fairchild, Limitation of New Judge-Made Law to Prospective Effect Only: "Prospec-
tive Overruling" or "Sunbursting," 51 MARQ. L. REv. 254 (1968).
5. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
6. Id. at 629.
7. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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ministration of justice if the new rule were applied retroactively.8 The
result of these two decisions was to give the judicial branch some
flexibility and discretion in applying retroactively or prospectively new
constitutional decisions. This discretionary approach was adopted to
alleviate the problem of instability faced by the judicial system in apply-
ing the traditional rule of retroactivity to new constitutional decisions
in the area of criminal law.9
Since Linkletter, the majority of the Court's decisions on retroactivity
in criminal cases have dealt with constitutional procedural rules.' 0 The
Court has never applied Linkletter and Stovall directly to a case in-
volving subject-matter jurisdiction." Since Flemings dealt with subject-
matter jurisdiction the district court felt it was not bound by Linkletter
and Stovall. Therefore, the court, relying on United States v. United
States Coin and Currency,'2 applied to Flemings the traditional rule
that all new decisions receive retroactive application.
United States Coin and Currency applied retroactively Marchetti v.
United States" and Grosso v. United States.'4 These cases taken together
say certain activity that had been statutorily prohibited was constitution-
ally immune from punishment. In effect, the Court in United States
Coin and Currency decided that Congress had no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the activity in question. The crime allegedly com-
mitted by the petitioner was the failure to fill out certain Internal
Revenue forms. These forms were held to be self-incriminating, and
therefore any prosecution for not filling them out was a violation of the
fifth amendment. In both United States Coin and Currency and Flem-
ings the courts were asked to retroactively apply a new constitutional
rule which dealt with subject-matter jurisdiction. United States Coin
and Currency applied the new rule retroactively. The court in Flemings
justified its traditional application of retroactivity on the rationale of
United States Coin and Currency.
8. Id. at 297.
9. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 676 (1971) (Justice Harlan dissenting). Justice
Harlan mentioned the different rationales used to support the doctrine of prospectivity
used by the Court in recent decisions. The rationale accepted today, is that the doctrine
affords more stability to the judicial process because the new rule of Linkletter does not
apply an automatic retroactive effect to new decisions. The essence of the old rule is
that all new decisions are given retrospective application. See In re Lake Champlain Pulp
and Paper Corporation, 20 F.2d 425 (N.D. N.Y. 1927).
10. Flemings v. Chafee, 330 F. Supp. 193, 195 (E.D. N.Y. 1971). See Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971).
11. 330 F. Supp. at 201.
12. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
13. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
14. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
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It is suggested that the reasoning in United States Coin and Currency
does not support the application in Flemings of the traditional rule of
retroactivity. The Court in United States Coin and Currency said, in
deciding the application of the Marchetti and Grosso rule:
Unlike some of our earlier retroactive decisions we are not here
concerned with the implementation of a procedural rule which does
not undermine the basic accuracy of the fact-finding process at
trial. . . . Rather Marchetti and Grosso dealt with the kind of
activity that cannot be constitutionally punished in the first in-
stance.1
5
This distinction made by the Court is between cases involving constitu-
tional procedural rules and those involving subject-matter jurisdiction.
Since Congress lacked criminal jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the alleged offenses in Marchetti and Grosso that activity could not be
punished.
In United States Coin and Currency the Court did not talk about the
traditional rule of retroactivity. Instead, the Court analyzed the problem
in terms of the Stovall test. The passage. quoted from United States
Coin and Currency is the language used in Stovall to determine the
purpose of the new rule.16 The majority said the government would
have to accept the "relatively insignificant inconvenience involved in
defending any lawsuits that may be anticipated" from the retroactive
application of the Marchetti rule. 17 The Court Was speaking within the
confines of the reliance and burden considerations of Stovall. Justice
Brennan in his concurring opinion quoted Williams v. United States:'8
"Neither good-faith reliance by state or federal authorities on prior
constitutional law or accepted practice, nor severe impact on the ad-
ministration of justice has sufficed to require prospective application in
these circumstances.' 9 In effect the Court applied the Stovall test in
United States Coin and Currency. The Flemings court was incorrect in
its observation that Linkletter and Stovall had not been applied to
questions of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court in Flemings relied
on United States Coin and Currency to apply the traditional rule of
retroactivity, but that was the case in which the Supreme Court im-
pliedly extended the Stovall test to areas of subject-matter jurisdiction.
15. 401 U.S. at 723.
16. See 388 U.S. at 298.
17. 401 U.S. at 723.
18. 401 U.S. 646 (1971).
19. 401 U.S. at 725.
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The problem remains whether or not to apply O'Callahan retro-
actively under the Stovall test. The first consideration is the purpose to
be served by the O'Callahan decision. Other courts have decided that
the purpose of the O'Callahan decision was to extend to military service-
men the constitutional right to a trial by jury20 in cases not "arising in
the land and naval forces." These courts have specifically rejected the
approach taken by the court in Flemings, that the purpose of O'Callahan
was to deny courts-martial subject-matter jurisdiction over certain types
of crimes. Once O'Callahan is read as an extension of the jury trial right,
the authority for prospective application is DeStefano v. Woods.21
That case held that-the denial of a jury trial had not adversely affected
the fact-finding process at trial, since a judge could not be said to be un-
fair. Therefore, the right was applied prospectively. The courts which
read O'Callahan as a decision of constitutional law used DeStefano as au-
thority to apply O'Callahan prospectively.
It is submitted that even if the purpose of O'Callahan, as the court in
Flemings saw it, was to deny courts-martial subject-matter jurisdiction
over certain crimes, this purpose would not be served by retroactive
application. Although the rules applied retroactively in United States
Coin and Currency and Flemings both dealt with subject-matter juris-
diction, the two cases can be distinquished. The purpose of the Mar-
chetti rule was to prevent punishment of an activity which for
constitutional reasons could not be considered a crime. In the O'Cal-
lahan decision there was no question whether a crime had been com-
mitted. Only the court which would hear the case was in question.
Therefore, United States Coin and Currency is not controlling as to the
retroactive application of O'Callahan.
If the rule in O'Callahan would enhance the truth-determining pro-
cess at trial,22 retroactive application would be justified. The court in
O'Callahan commented extensively upon the differences between-mili-
tary and civilian court systems. 23 Only if these differences are intimately
related to the process of determining truth can defendants convicted
before 1969 be afforded relief by retroactive application of O'Callahan.
20. Thompson v. Parker, 308 F. Supp. 904 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Gosa v. Mayden, 305
F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Fla. 1969); Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264, 41 C.M.R. 264
(1970).
21. 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
22. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971).
23. 395 U.S. at 264. The essential difference between the two systems is that courts-
martial are part of a system of military discipline. This leaves the court-martial open to
the criticism that it practices retributive justice.
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A 1944 court-martial, however, cannot be said to be inherently incapable
of determining the truth about an auto theft. It is submitted there is no
characteristic of a court-martial which so works against the integrity of
the truth-determining process that a 1969 decision should be used to
overturn a 1944 court-martial conviction.
The second and third inquiries relevant to the retroactive applica-
tion of O'Callahan are the reliance by the military on pre-O'Callahan
rules and the burden on the administration of military justice. These
factors must be given special attention due to the statutes and cases
existing before O'Callahan was decided. In 1944 the Articles of War 24
were the statutory implementation of Congress' constitutional power to
regulate the military. These Articles gave courts-martial jurisdiction
over ordinary crimes, even in peacetime. Article 12 gave power to a
general court-martial to try "any person subject to military law in any
crime or offense made punishable by these articles .... -25 Robbery,
burglary, and larceny were crimes punishable by a court-martial, under
Article 93.26 According to the case law existing in 1944, the principle
of which was first decided in 1886,27 the only judicial test for determin-
ing court-martial jurisdiction was the status of the offender. 28 The
reliance by military authorities upon these laws and decisions was
present in almost every case before a court-martial. To determine how
many cases would be re-opened by a retroactive application of O'Cal-
lahan would be speculation. The burden upon the administration of
military justice would be awesome. The result of weighing the con-
siderations announced in Stovall leads to the conclusion that O'Callahan
should have been applied prospectively in Flemings. If the New York
District Court had correctly interpreted United States Coin and Cur-
rency it would have correctly applied O'Callahan.
Thomas C. Black
24. Act of Aug. 29, 1916, Chl. 418, § 1342, 39 Stat. 650-70 (1916).
25. Id. at 652.
26. Id. at 664.
27. Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886).
28. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.s. 1 (1942).
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